The Dick’s Sporting Goods NOligarchy Profile
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Dick’s Sporting Goods scores 54.8 on the NOligarchy Index — below its sector average, driven almost entirely by how it treats the gap between executive pay and the workers stocking its shelves and staffing its registers.
Current Pillar Scores
Political Access
92.0
Wealth Extraction
3.8
Playing by the Rules
50.4
Score history — 24 quarters
Tier bands show where each quarter's score falls — no numeric y-axis needed. The dashed ring marks the year-over-year comparison point. Tap any quarter but the first to see its pillar breakdown.
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Political Access Grade: 92.02/100. Dick’s spends nothing directly on federal lobbying and makes no Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions. But the company retains one outside lobbying firm with client ties to some of the most powerful corporations in the country — a connection that modestly reduces an otherwise clean political score.
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Wealth Extraction Grade: 3.78/100. This is the number that matters. A CEO pay ratio of 2198:1 combined with more than $610 million in stock buybacks over two fiscal years places Dick’s near the very bottom of the accountability scale on how it distributes wealth between the top and the workforce.
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Playing by the Rules Grade: 50.35/100. Four regulatory cases and $111,628 in penalties recorded between October 1, 2024 and September 30, 2026 — a modest fine total relative to the company’s scale, but complicated by $2 million in public subsidies collected over the same period.
Dick’s Sporting Goods ranks 20 out of 22 among companies sharing its federal industry classification — sporting goods, hobby, and musical instrument retailers — trailing the sector average of 69.5.
The Bottom Line: A Billion Dollars for Shareholders, $11,259 for the Median Worker
Dick’s Sporting Goods brought in $17.2 billion in annual revenue. Over the last two fiscal years it channeled more than $610 million into stock buybacks and nearly $776 million in dividends — a combined $1.38 billion handed back to shareholders while its median employee took home $11,259 for the year, a figure that doesn’t cover rent in most of the cities where Dick’s stores operate. The company stayed almost entirely out of Washington’s lobbying machinery, which is notable at its scale — though a retained outside firm with connections to some of America’s largest corporations keeps that grade from being perfect. The accountability problem here isn’t primarily about political influence — it’s about who gets the money once the registers close.
A Quiet Network Behind the Zero Spend
From Q4 2024 through Q3 2026 (8 quarters — the two-year tracking period), Dick’s Sporting Goods spent exactly $0 on federal lobbying and made no PAC contributions. The Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) search returns no active filings, and no former government officials were brought on staff to work the halls of Congress.
The only political signal on the direct-spend side is $2,000 in personal donations made by company executives — recorded at the Federal Election Commission (FEC). At a company pulling in $17 billion a year, that is not an influence operation.
What the data does show is that Dick’s retains one outside firm: FGS Global (US) LLC (formerly FGH Holdings LLC). That firm also represents Apple Inc, Lenovo Group Limited, The Walt Disney Company, Verizon, and Walmart Inc. Dick’s doesn’t control those relationships, and the LDA filings show no lobbying spend attributable to Dick’s itself. But sharing a firm with corporations of that scale means operating inside the same political infrastructure — a connection that is visible even when the billing line reads zero.
Shared Lobbying Exposure
Dick's Sporting Goods
client
FGS GLOBAL (US) LLC (FKA FGH HOLDINGS LLC)
lobbying firm
Apple Inc
also a client
Lenovo Group Limited
also a client
The Walt Disney Company
also a client
+2 more
clients
Why it matters: the same firm argues Dick's Sporting Goods’s case and its rivals’ — one hire buys a web of shared access that can’t be seen from outside. This network worsens Dick's Sporting Goods’s political-access score (see methodology for the exact factor).
A Billion-Dollar Payout While the Median Worker Earns $11,259
The CEO pay ratio at Dick’s Sporting Goods tells the story plainly. The CEO pay ratio is 2198:1, the 3-year average of Compensation Actually Paid, according to the SEC DEF 14A. The CEO’s three-year average package was about $24.8 million. The median Dick’s employee — the person folding jerseys, processing returns, or lifting weights onto shelves — earned $11,259 for the entire year. That is below the federal poverty line for a family of two.
The Shareholder Payout
Over the two most recent fiscal years, Dick’s spent $347 million in FY2025 and $263 million in FY2024 on a deliberate reduction in shares outstanding that inflates per-share metrics and triggers executive performance bonuses — totaling roughly $610 million in buybacks. On top of that, the company paid out $413.9 million in dividends in fiscal 2025 and $361.7 million in fiscal 2024, bringing total shareholder returns over the two-year span to approximately $1.38 billion.
That $1.38 billion went disproportionately to the wealthiest 10% of Americans, who own 93% of the stock market.
The Missed Raise
The company made a deliberate choice. The money spent on buying back its own stock could have instead handed every single one of its 59,750 workers a $10,211.77 raise, spread across the last 2 years. Spread evenly across those two years, that works out to a $5,105.89 annual raise the company chose not to give.
EARNINGS STATEMENT — ANNUAL
EMPLOYEE: 1 of 59,750
Your share of the buyback
+$10,212
Per biweekly paycheck
+$196.38
SPENT INFLATING THE SHARE PRICE
Reported stock buybacks over the last 24 months: $610.2 million.
Spread across Dick's Sporting Goods' 59,750 employees, its stock buybacks come to $10,212 per worker over the last 24 months of reported buybacks — about $196 on each of the 52 biweekly paychecks in that span.
The Dividend Factor
Dick’s didn’t abandon traditional dividends in favor of buybacks — it ran both simultaneously. The data shows the company paid out $775 million in dividends over two years while also spending $610 million on buybacks. These were not competing priorities. They were layered payouts, stacked on top of each other, while the median worker’s annual earnings didn’t change the household budget.
Executive Bonuses
When Dick’s reduces its shares outstanding through buybacks, the pool of shares shrinks, which mechanically lifts Earnings Per Share (EPS). That lifted EPS then triggers performance bonuses for the executives who approved the buyback program in the first place. The 2198:1 pay ratio is partly a product of this self-reinforcing loop.
Small Fines, Larger Subsidies
Between October 1, 2024 and September 30, 2026, Dick’s Sporting Goods accumulated four regulatory cases totaling $111,628 in penalties — spanning both consumer protection and worker safety failures. For a $17 billion retailer, that is still a modest fine record, but the case count and the mix of agencies involved signals something more than an isolated misstep.
Workplace safety violations drove the largest share of the total: three Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) citations combined for $65,628, including a $33,100 citation in 2026 and a $21,000 OSHA penalty also in 2026. The largest single case, however, was a $46,000 consumer protection penalty issued by the New Jersey Attorney General in 2024.
The Subsidy Flip
While regulators were issuing those citations, governments were simultaneously cutting Dick’s tax credits. Between October 1, 2024 and September 30, 2026, Dick’s collected $2,014,384 in public subsidies — all in the form of tax credits and rebates. The largest single grant was $829,242 from a local government in New York, matched by a second $829,242 New York credit, plus $355,900 from Pennsylvania.
The arithmetic is stark: $2 million in taxpayer-funded subsidies against $111,628 in regulatory fines.
$2 million
taxpayer subsidies
$111,628
regulatory fines
18:1
Dick's Sporting Goods collected $2 million in taxpayer subsidies against $111,628 in regulatory fines — 18 subsidy dollars for every $1 in penalties.