The Gap NOligarchy Profile
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Gap scores 35.96 out of 100 on the NOligarchy index — placing it dead last in its sector. From Q4 2024 through Q3 2026 (8 quarters — the two-year tracking period), the data reveals a company that spent millions securing Washington access and returned hundreds of millions to shareholders, while the median worker took home $10,170 a year.
Current Pillar Scores
Political Access
26.9
Wealth Extraction
13.9
Playing by the Rules
95.0
Score history — 24 quarters
Tier bands show where each quarter's score falls — no numeric y-axis needed. The dashed ring marks the year-over-year comparison point. Tap any quarter but the first to see its pillar breakdown.
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Political Access Grade: 26.88/100. Gap channeled $2.07 million into federal lobbying and $208,000 through its Political Action Committee (PAC), keeping a large and well-connected influence operation active across both chambers of Congress and more than a dozen federal agencies.
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Wealth Extraction Grade: 13.9/100. A CEO pay ratio of 3,392:1 and $230 million in stock buybacks — on top of $472 million in dividends — define a company that directed its returns overwhelmingly to the top.
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Playing by the Rules Grade: 95.0/100. A single workplace safety fine of $8,440 from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is the only penalty on the public record for this period — the cleanest compliance record among Gap’s three pillars.
The Sector Context: Gap ranks 23rd out of 23 among companies sharing its federal industry classification (Clothing and clothing accessories retailers) — last place in its sector. The sector average score is 68.0 — more than 32 points higher than Gap’s 35.96. Gap’s United States revenue segment generated $13.5 billion, representing 4.14% of the Clothing and clothing accessories retailers market. For higher-scoring places to shop, see the Better Alternatives section below.
The Bottom Line: A Workforce of 77,000 Watching $700 Million Flow Past Them
Gap generated $15.4 billion in annual revenue. Over the two-year period it channeled $2.07 million to lobbyists and committed $230 million to buying back its own stock — a deliberate reduction in shares outstanding that inflates per-share metrics and triggers executive performance bonuses — on top of nearly half a billion dollars in dividends. Meanwhile, Gap’s median employee earned just $10,170 a year, a figure that barely clears the federal poverty line for a single adult, while the CEO’s three-year average package came to about $34.5 million. The math is not ambiguous: Gap chose its shareholders and its executives, and left its 77,215 workers out of the equation entirely.
Spending to Buy a Seat at the Table
Gap poured $2.07 million into federal lobbying during the two-year period, plus $208,000 through its PAC and a further $38,564 in executive donations tracked by the Federal Election Commission (FEC). That combined spending kept 31 registered lobbyists active across the House of Representatives, the Senate, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, and a string of other agencies.
Trade dominates the lobbying agenda — 34 separate filings under that issue area, more than any other topic. For a clothing company that sources garments globally, this is direct commercial logic: tariffs on imported apparel cut straight into margins. Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) filings consistently reference Haiti trade preference legislation and tariffs on apparel. Lobbyists also cited the Buying American Cotton Act of 2025 — an in-progress Senate bill still awaiting action from the Committee on Finance — four times across separate filings, and the companion Buying American Cotton Act of 2026, currently sitting with the House Committee on Ways and Means, twice. Both bills fall under the taxation policy area. Gap sources cotton-based apparel at significant scale, so legislation touching cotton procurement incentives is directly relevant to its supply chain economics.
Taxation is the second-largest lobbying focus (23 filings), followed by consumer privacy and data protection, textile circularity (an environmental policy area covering how clothing is reclaimed or disposed of at end of life), workforce development, and the Communications, Omnibus, Reform, Clarification, and Accountability Act (CORCA) — referenced in telecommunications filings under H.R. 2853 and S. 1404.
Gap’s PAC gave $56,500 to Democratic candidates and $53,000 to Republican candidates — a 51.6% / 48.4% split that buys access to whichever party wins.
Gap's PAC gave $56,500 to Democrats and $53,000 to Republicans — a 51.6% / 48.4% split that buys access to whichever party wins.
51.6%
48.4%
Democrats · $56,500
Republicans · $53,000
ACCESS-BUYER PENALTY APPLIED
Twenty-one of Gap’s 31 registered lobbyists previously held government posts — a revolving door that delivers institutional memory money cannot easily replicate. Among them: a former International Trade Policy Adviser to the House Ways and Means Committee, a former Tax Counsel to Ways and Means and Staff Director of its Select Revenue Measures Subcommittee, a former Majority Staff Director on the Senate Finance Subcommittee on International Trade, Customs, and Global Competitiveness, and a former Clerk and Staff Director of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment and Related Agencies. These are not generic Washington hands — they are precisely the former insiders with relationships in the committees that write trade and tax law.
Shared Lobbying Exposure
Gap
client
AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD
lobbying firm
AT&T
also a client
Amazon.com Inc
also a client
Dell Technologies Inc
also a client
+10 more
clients
CAPITOL 6 ADVISORS also lobbies for L.L.Bean, VF Corporation
FEROX STRATEGIES also lobbies for Walmart Inc
THE WASHINGTON TAX & PUBLIC POLICY GROUP also lobbies for Berkshire Hathaway Inc
Why it matters: the same firm argues Gap’s case and its rivals’ — one hire buys a web of shared access that can’t be seen from outside. This network worsens Gap’s political-access score (see methodology for the exact factor).
Gap retains five outside lobbying firms, four of which simultaneously represent other major corporations tracked in this database. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld — the flagship firm — also works for Amazon.com Inc, AT&T, Microsoft Corporation, Target Corporation, Walmart Inc, and several apparel competitors. Ferox Strategies also represents Walmart Inc. The Washington Tax & Public Policy Group also represents Berkshire Hathaway Inc.
The CEO Made 3,392 Times What the Median Worker Took Home
Gap’s CEO pay ratio is 3392:1, the 3-year average of Compensation Actually Paid, per the SEC DEF 14A. The CEO’s three-year average package was about $34.5 million. The median Gap employee earned $10,170 — meaning the typical Gap worker, staffing fitting rooms and processing returns, made in a year what the CEO earns in less than three hours.
EARNINGS STATEMENT — ANNUAL
EMPLOYEE: 1 of 77,215
Your share of the buyback
+$2,979
Per biweekly paycheck
+$57.28
SPENT INFLATING THE SHARE PRICE
Reported stock buybacks over the last 24 months: $230 million.
Spread across Gap's 77,215 employees, its stock buybacks come to $2,979 per worker over the last 24 months of reported buybacks — about $57 on each of the 52 biweekly paychecks in that span.
The Shareholder Payout: Over the two fiscal years captured in the data, Gap spent $230 million buying back its own stock — a deliberate reduction in shares outstanding that inflates per-share metrics and triggers executive performance bonuses — and handed $472 million in dividends to shareholders on top of that. That is $702 million returned to capital owners in two years. The wealthiest 10% of Americans own 93% of the stock market, so nearly all of that flowed upward.
The Missed Raise: The company made a deliberate choice. The money spent on buying back its own stock could have instead handed every single one of its 77,215 workers a $2,978.70 raise, spread across the last 2 fiscal years. Spread evenly across those two years, that works out to a $1,489.35 annual raise the company chose not to give.
Buybacks vs. Workers
What the buyback spend could have meant for 77K employees
Spent on buybacks
$230.0M
directed to shareholders
÷ 77K
workers
Per-worker raise
$2,979
per employee, 2-year total
Spread over those 2 years, that's a 15% annual raise on the median worker's $10,170 salary — money the company chose to send to shareholders instead.
The Dividend Factor: Gap did not abandon traditional dividends — it paid $472 million across fiscal years 2024 and 2025 while simultaneously running $230 million in buybacks. The data shows it didn’t have to choose between its investors and its workforce; it could have paid out $472 million in traditional dividends and still funded that worker raise. It simply chose not to.
Executive Bonuses: When buybacks reduce the number of shares outstanding, Earnings Per Share (EPS) rises even if actual earnings stay flat. That EPS bump directly triggers performance bonuses for the same executives who approved the buyback program. With a CEO pay ratio of 3,392:1, the incentive to run that cycle is substantial.
Paying Above the Statutory Rate — and Still Holding Disputed Positions Worth 33% of Pre-Tax Income: Gap paid an effective tax rate of 27.9% — 6.9 percentage points above the 21% federal statutory rate that Congress set, and 3.2 percentage points above the 24.7% median paid by companies in the same sector. The largest drivers pushing Gap’s bill higher are state and local income taxes (net of federal benefit) at +4.4 percentage points, attributable primarily to New York, California, New Jersey, New York City, Illinois, Florida, and Pennsylvania — the major retail markets where Gap operates stores. Changes in valuation allowances added 1.4pp and changes in unrecognized tax benefits added a further 1.4pp.
The company’s 10-K discloses research and development credits that reduced the effective rate by 1.1pp — though the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has sought to disallow approximately $41 million of those R&D credits for tax years 2009 through 2013, a matter Gap has petitioned the U.S. Tax Court to resolve. A U.S. transfer pricing settlement related to its sourcing activities generated a $32 million benefit during fiscal 2023. The filing also discloses $603 million of foreign loss carryovers, $61 million of foreign tax credit carryovers, and $311 million in total valuation allowances against deferred tax assets the company judges unlikely to be realized.
Gap paid 6.9pp more than the rate Congress set and 3.2pp more than its own sector peers — in this case reflecting the weight of multi-state retail operations rather than a structural reduction. On top of that, Gap holds Unrecognized Tax Benefits equal to 33% of its pre-tax income — contested deductions it has claimed on its taxes that the IRS has not yet agreed are valid.
One Safety Fine, Dwarfed by the Revenue It Protects
Between 2024-10-01 and 2026-09-30 — the two-year tracking period — Good Jobs First’s Violation Tracker records a single penalty against Gap: an $8,440 OSHA fine issued in 2025 for a workplace safety or health violation. One case. One fine. In two years.
To put that figure in scale: $8,440 against $15.4 billion in annual revenue is approximately 0.00005% of Gap’s top line. It is less than what the company spends on lobbying in a single day. The penalty record on the source site extends well beyond this two-year period; what is captured here is a fraction of Gap’s full docket.
The Subsidy Flip: While regulators issued that penalty, governments were simultaneously handing Gap public money. Between 2024-10-01 and 2026-09-30, Gap received $675,000 in public subsidies — including a $675,000 tax credit or rebate from New York State in 2024, plus six property tax abatements in Tennessee across 2024 and 2025. Public money flowing to a company reporting $15.4 billion in annual revenue, tracked by Good Jobs First.