The Lee / Wrangler NOligarchy Profile
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Lee / Wrangler — the jeans and workwear brand owned by Kontoor Brands Inc — scores 58.67 out of 100 on the NOligarchy Index, from Q4 2024 through Q3 2026 (8 quarters — the two-year tracking period).
Current Pillar Scores
Political Access
59.1
Wealth Extraction
28.7
Playing by the Rules
100.0
Score history — 24 quarters
Tier bands show where each quarter's score falls — no numeric y-axis needed. The dashed ring marks the year-over-year comparison point. Tap any quarter but the first to see its pillar breakdown.
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Political Access Grade: 59.15/100. The company channeled $400,000 into federal lobbying focused entirely on trade policy, retaining a single outside firm staffed by former government insiders. No Political Action Committee (PAC) spending and no disclosed executive donations reduce that influence footprint.
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Wealth Extraction Grade: 28.72/100. This is the sharpest edge of the company’s public record. A CEO pay ratio of 1,754-to-one — set against a median worker salary of $10,618 a year — combined with $110.7 million in buybacks and $228.1 million in dividends, places shareholder enrichment at the center of corporate decision-making.
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Playing by the Rules Grade: 100/100. No regulatory fines or violations appear on the public record. Lee / Wrangler presents a clean slate on enforcement.
The Sector Context: Lee / Wrangler ranks 18th out of 23 among companies sharing its federal industry classification (Clothing and clothing accessories retailers), trailing the sector average score of 68.0. That gap makes the brand an accountability laggard within its own industry grouping.
Wall Street Gets $338 Million. Workers Get $10,618.
Lee / Wrangler generated $3.15 billion in annual revenue. Over the same two-year period, the company handed roughly $338.8 million to shareholders through buybacks and dividends while the typical worker on its payroll took home $10,618 for an entire year — less than $900 a month. The CEO’s three-year average compensation package came to about $18.6 million, a ratio of 1,754-to-one against that median salary. And $400,000 flowed to Washington, retained to shape the international trade rules that determine where these garments get made — and at what wage.
Four Lobbyists. One Mission: Trade Policy.
From Q4 2024 through Q3 2026, Lee / Wrangler poured $400,000 into federal lobbying — every dollar aimed at a single issue area: trade. The company retained one outside firm, BGR Government Affairs, which also represents Alibaba Group Holding Limited, CVS Health Corporation, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Verizon, and Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc — some of the largest corporations in the country, all buying access through the same door.
Shared Lobbying Exposure
Lee / Wrangler
client
BGR GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
lobbying firm
Alibaba Group Holding Limited
also a client
CVS Health Corporation
also a client
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
also a client
+2 more
clients
Why it matters: the same firm argues Lee / Wrangler’s case and its rivals’ — one hire buys a web of shared access that can’t be seen from outside. This network worsens Lee / Wrangler’s political-access score (see methodology for the exact factor).
The reason trade is the sole focus is straightforward: Lee and Wrangler garments are manufactured across an international supply chain, and the tariffs, import rules, and trade agreements that Congress and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) control directly determine what the company pays to produce its products. Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) filings describe the work as “strategic counsel and advocacy on international trade and public policy matters impacting the apparel supply chain.” Lobbyists made contact with the House of Representatives eight times, the Senate eight times, the USTR six times, the White House Office six times, and the Department of State twice.
THE PUBLIC DOOR
Public comment form
90-day docket
maybe a form reply
WAIT: MONTHS
THE REVOLVING DOOR
3 lobbyists on the roster once held covered government positions.
One was Sp. Asst. to POTUS for Leg Affairs.
WAIT: NONE
3 of the lobbyists on Lee / Wrangler's filings previously held covered government positions — the same door, entered from both sides.
Three of the four registered lobbyists previously held senior government positions. Joseph Lai served as Special Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs. Robert Lehman served as Chief of Staff to the Office of the USTR and to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Lester Munson served as Staff Director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These are not generalist lobbyists — they are architects of the very trade frameworks their client now pays them to influence.
A CEO Who Earns in Two Days What Most Workers Earn All Year
The defining number in Lee / Wrangler’s public record is $10,618 — what the company’s median employee took home in a full year. That works out to roughly $884 a month, below the federal poverty line for a family of two. It reflects a workforce heavily concentrated in lower-wage manufacturing and distribution roles, many of them overseas.
Against that backdrop, the CEO pay ratio is 1754:1, the 3-year average of Compensation Actually Paid, per the SEC DEF 14A. The CEO’s three-year average package was about $18.6 million. A typical Lee / Wrangler worker, earning $10,618 a year, would need to stay employed for 1,754 years to match one year of that compensation.
The Shareholder Payout
Over the two-year period, Lee / Wrangler executed a deliberate reduction in shares outstanding that inflates per-share metrics and triggers executive performance bonuses — spending $110.7 million on buybacks across FY2024 and FY2025. Alongside that, the company paid out $228.1 million in dividends. Together, that is roughly $338.8 million funneled to shareholders while the median worker earned less than some Americans spend monthly on rent.
The Missed Raise
The company made a deliberate choice. The money spent on buying back its own stock could have instead handed every single one of its 9,169 workers a $12,070.78 raise, spread across the last 2 fiscal years. Spread evenly across those two years, that works out to a $6,035.39 annual raise the company chose not to give.
Buybacks vs. Workers
What the buyback spend could have meant for 9K employees
Spent on buybacks
$110.7M
directed to shareholders
÷ 9K
workers
Per-worker raise
$12,071
per employee, 2-year total
Spread over those 2 years, that's a 57% annual raise on the median worker's $10,618 salary — money the company chose to send to shareholders instead.
The data shows they didn’t have to choose between their investors and their workforce; they could have paid out $228.1 million in traditional dividends and still funded that entire worker raise from buybacks alone. They simply chose not to. By concentrating shareholder returns into buybacks rather than dividends, the company deployed a mechanism that disproportionately rewards insiders and large institutional holders who can time their exits — while doing nothing for the workers who manufacture, pack, and ship the product.
EARNINGS STATEMENT — ANNUAL
EMPLOYEE: 1 of 9,169
Your share of the buyback
+$12,071
Per biweekly paycheck
+$232.13
SPENT INFLATING THE SHARE PRICE
Reported stock buybacks over the last 24 months: $110.7 million.
Spread across Lee / Wrangler's 9,169 employees, its stock buybacks come to $12,071 per worker over the last 24 months of reported buybacks — about $232 on each of the 52 biweekly paychecks in that span.
A Clean Record on the Public Docket
No regulatory fines, penalties, or legal violations appear on the public record for Lee / Wrangler between Q4 2024 and Q3 2026. Across labor enforcement, environmental compliance, consumer protection, and other regulatory agencies tracked in this database, the company shows zero reported infractions for that span. No public subsidy data is recorded for the same period. On enforcement, at least, this is the one pillar where Lee / Wrangler’s record is unambiguous.