The Samsung NOligarchy Profile
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NOligarchy Score
45.3
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samsung.com
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Samsung’s NOligarchy Score is 45.4 out of 100 — the lower the score, the more the data flags concern across political access, wealth extraction, and legal compliance. Measured from Q3 2024 through Q2 2026 (8 quarters — the two-year tracking period), the picture is of a foreign-owned technology giant that persistently works the levers of American policy while keeping its internal pay structure shielded from public scrutiny — and whose regulatory record, on close inspection, spans two distinct categories of rule-breaking.
Current Pillar Scores
Political Access
39.9
Wealth Extraction
69.2
Playing by the Rules
15.7
Score history — 23 quarters
Tier bands show where each quarter's score falls — no numeric y-axis needed. The dashed ring marks the year-over-year comparison point. Tap any quarter but the first to see its pillar breakdown.
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Political Access Grade: 39.86/100. This score reflects $530,000 in federal lobbying expenditures and $345,000 channeled through a Political Action Committee (PAC) — a combined influence footprint that kept Samsung actively engaged with both chambers of Congress and key federal agencies across every quarter of the tracked period.
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Wealth Extraction Grade: 69.5/100. No stock buyback or dividend data is recorded for the US subsidiary, but an estimated CEO pay gap — based on industry benchmarks — reveals a sharp imbalance between what executives take home and what frontline workers earn.
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Playing by the Rules Grade: 15.66/100. This score reflects over $1.5 million in regulatory penalties across two separate enforcement actions, spanning economic sanctions and environmental compliance.
Samsung ranks 10th out of 12 among companies sharing its federal industry classification, Computer & Electronic Product Manufacturing. The sector average score is 61.4, and Samsung’s 45.4 falls well below that line — placing it among the two lowest-scoring companies in its peer group. For higher-scoring places to shop in this category, see the Better Alternatives section below.
The Bottom Line: Lobbying Hard, Paying Fines, and Keeping Pay in the Dark
Samsung Electronics America is the US arm of one of the largest consumer electronics companies on earth. It chose to spend over half a million dollars lobbying Congress and federal agencies during the two-year period, while keeping its executive compensation structure entirely out of public view. What is visible is a company that poured money into semiconductor subsidies, 5G spectrum policy, and international trade rules — every one of them core to Samsung’s commercial interests — while regulators simultaneously fined its affiliates over $1.5 million for a sanctions violation and an environmental breach. The most damaging number in this profile is the Playing by the Rules score of 15.66 out of 100: a figure that places Samsung among the weakest accountability performers in its entire sector, driven by a single sanctions penalty alone that cost more than $1.4 million. A company that spends half a million dollars shaping federal rules also chose to break them — in two separate regulatory domains at once.
Spending to Buy a Seat at the Table
Samsung spent $530,000 on federal lobbying during the two-year period, according to Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) filings — over half a million dollars deployed to keep Samsung’s voice in front of lawmakers. The spend ran at $150,000 in 2024 and $260,000 in 2025, with $120,000 filed in the first half of 2026. On a quarterly basis the rate held remarkably steady, with six-figure annual totals posted every year of the tracking period.
The issue areas Samsung chose to prioritize are a precise map of its commercial interests. Lobbyists filed on Manufacturing eight times — consistently focused on the implementation of the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act (Public Law 117-167), the federal law that funneled tens of billions of dollars in subsidies to chipmakers operating in the United States. Samsung operates a semiconductor fabrication plant in Texas and has announced plans to expand US chip production, making CHIPS Act appropriations directly worth billions to the parent company. Recent filings also flagged supply chain issues alongside CHIPS Act implementation.
Lobbyists filed eight times each on Computer Industry issues (cybersecurity, the Internet of Things, and Artificial Intelligence), Trade policy (supply chain rules, bilateral and multilateral trade proceedings), Budget and Appropriations (energy efficiency programs, telecommunications funding, and semiconductor incentives), and Telecommunications (5G, spectrum allocation, and wireless broadband). Samsung sells smartphones, televisions, home appliances, and semiconductors — it sits at the intersection of every one of those policy arenas. The Department of Energy was contacted directly five times, a clear signal that Samsung is watching federal energy efficiency program funding closely, since those programs directly subsidize the sale of energy-rated consumer electronics and appliances. The House of Representatives and the Senate were each contacted 47 times — a full sweep of the legislative branch.
On top of the $530,000 in lobbying fees, Samsung’s PAC handed $345,000 to federal candidates and committees, per Federal Election Commission (FEC) records — $146,000 to Democrats and $157,500 to Republicans, a 48.1% / 51.9% split. This is not ideological conviction; it is access-buying. A company that hedges its contributions across both parties is not trying to win an election — it is trying to ensure that whoever wins will return its calls.
Samsung's PAC gave $146,000 to Democrats and $157,500 to Republicans — a 48.1% / 51.9% split that buys access to whichever party wins.
48.1%
51.9%
Democrats · $146,000
Republicans · $157,500
ACCESS-BUYER PENALTY APPLIED
Samsung executives and employees added another $14,365 in personal contributions on top of the PAC spending, per FEC records.
Samsung’s LDA filings also flag the involvement of a foreign entity — a disclosure required when a foreign principal has a role in directing or overseeing lobbying activity. Samsung Electronics America is a wholly owned subsidiary of Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., headquartered in South Korea. The lobbying conducted in Washington is not fully separable from the interests of that Korean corporate parent.
Six of Samsung’s fourteen registered lobbyists previously held positions in the federal government, per LDA disclosures: Fred Turner, Robin Colwell (who held roles including Special Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, Chief Counsel to the House Energy & Commerce Committee, and Counsel to the Senate Commerce Committee), Justin Rzepka, Erskine Wells, Andrew Lewin, and Jonathan Mantz. That is nearly half the lobbying roster — former government insiders now paid to leverage relationships built in public service on behalf of a foreign-owned technology company.
One of Samsung’s two retained outside lobbying firms — Roberti Global (formerly Roberti White, LLC) — also represents AT&T, according to LDA filings.
Shared Lobbying Exposure
Samsung
client
ROBERTI GLOBAL (FKA ROBERTI WHITE, LLC)
lobbying firm
AT&T
also a client
Why it matters: the same firm argues Samsung’s case and its rivals’ — one hire buys a web of shared access that can’t be seen from outside. This network worsens Samsung’s political-access score (see methodology for the exact factor).
An Undisclosed Pay Gap Behind Closed Doors
Samsung Electronics America’s CEO pay ratio is not publicly disclosed. The best available figure is 115:1, based on AFL-CIO Executive Paywatch industry benchmarks for comparable companies in this sector, per AFL-CIO Executive Paywatch. That means for every dollar a median Samsung worker earns, the executive at the top of the US operation is estimated to take home $115. The true figure could be higher or lower, and there is no way for the public — or Samsung’s own workers — to verify it.
No stock buyback or dividend data is recorded for Samsung Electronics America. As a subsidiary of the South Korean parent, its spending and investment decisions flow through the parent company’s consolidated accounts and are not reported separately in US public filings. The pay gap, such as it is, sits behind a wall of corporate structure that US disclosure rules do not penetrate.
$1.5 Million Across Two Agencies
Over the two-year tracking period from Q3 2024 through Q2 2026, Samsung’s US entities accumulated $1,547,308 in regulatory penalties across two separate cases, according to Good Jobs First. That figure covers only what was recorded during this window; the company’s full historical docket on the source site goes back further.
Regulatory Violations by Year
$1.5M · 2 cases
$93K
2024
1 case
$1.5M
2025
1 case
The largest — and most serious — was a $1,454,145 penalty levied in 2025 by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the Treasury Department unit that enforces US economic sanctions. That is roughly $1,454 for every $1,000 a median full-time US worker earns in a year. Sanctions violations are not paperwork errors — they represent transactions or dealings that US law prohibits, designed to prevent American-connected companies from doing business with sanctioned countries or entities. That single penalty accounts for 94 cents of every dollar Samsung paid in regulatory fines during the entire tracked period.
The second case was a $93,163 environmental penalty issued in 2024 by the Texas environmental agency against a Samsung semiconductor operation for a solid waste violation. Two separate agencies. Two separate categories of infraction.
The Subsidy Flip: While regulators were issuing those fines, a local government was simultaneously handing Samsung public money. In 2024, a Samsung semiconductor entity received a $125,734 subsidy from a California government authority, according to Good Jobs First Subsidy Tracker records. The same year one Samsung operation was cited for an environmental breach, another arm was collecting public funds. That juxtaposition — penalties on one hand, government grants on the other — is a recurring feature of how large technology manufacturers interact with public institutions in the United States.